Little Known Facts That Changed The Course Of The Civil War

Andy Mateja is a Chicago native who was fascinated by the Civil War. Over the past 40 years, he has amassed an impressive library of hundreds of Civil War Books and trade publications. He is currently using these resources as a basis for the development and writing of an unprecedented analysis of the Battle of Gettysburg, specifically the 2nd day of the conflict. Andy has spent countless hours researching important battles from numerous sources, including widely recognized publications, to gain valuable insight from the authors comparing them to official battle reports filed by the actual field commanders and their post-battle assessments. He looks forward to hearing from other Civil War aficionados and engaging in spirited dialogue regarding the truth about the conflict that changed America.

Headquarters in the Saddle – John Pope

by Andy Mateja

The saga of Union Maj Gen John Pope is one of the most interesting of the Civil War. He has been called “Five Cent Pope” by the Northern press primarily because of his bombastic comments such as: “I have come to you from the West where we have always seen the backs of our enemies: from an army whose policy has been attack not defense….I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find so much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of “taking strong positions and holding them ‘of “lines of retreat” and of “base of supplies”. Let us discard such ideas ……success and glory are in advance …..disaster and shame lurk in the rear” after assuming command of the newly formed Army of Virginia on June 27th 1862.

Pope had offended both Northerners AND Southerners with Union Maj Gen Fitz-John Porter commenting “Pope has now written himself down what the military world has long known ….an ass” and Lt Gen James Longstreet saying  “ (Pope’s) words would seem to indicate a great contempt for his enemy”.

Pope was stunned by the negative response.  He only wanted to invigorate the Eastern Union troops which he felt, based on their recent performance, was sadly wanting

John Pope was born in Kentucky and raised in Illinois. Easterners referred to him as a “bag of wind”, as he was considered a loud mouth and a braggart with an abrasive personality. he had a penchant for  expensive cigars and whiskey

Pope did not have many friends in the army and entered West Point in 1838 at age of 16.  He graduated 17th out of 56 in 1842 as an Engineer and brevetted captain during Mexican War.  Pope was promoted to captain in the regular army in 1853 and served for a total of 48 years until 1886. Unlike McClellan, Pope was a man of action and some politicians called him the favorite son of ILL.

Perhaps the greatest asset was his acquaintance with Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln knew Pope’s father well who had been a Federal Judge in Illinois.  Pope had accompanied Lincoln on his inaugural train ride from Springfield to Washington in early 1861 and maintained a friendly relationship with him throughout the Civil War.

Pope began the war as a Brigadier General of volunteers in Missouri. He went on to command the Union Army of Mississippi in 1862 to assist in opening up navigation on the Mississippi River. Pope had captured New Madrid Mo in March 1862 and shortly thereafter captured Island #10 through the creative use of military ingenuity. He had captured thousands of Confederate prisoners and enormous amounts of artillery with minimal loss to his own forces.  It was during this time that some believed Pope developed his contempt for the enemy.

Lincoln promoted his friend to Major General after his victories in the West and brought him East on June 27th 1862 to command newly formed Army of Virginia.  It was comprised of troops from the Shenandoah Valley and original reinforcements originally intended for McClellan during Peninsular Campaign.  Pope did not join the army in the field until July 29th, almost a month after being appointed to command, and did little to unify the different elements brought together. Pope not happy about his assignment, as all his corps commanders were senior to him in rank and far more familiar with the battlegrounds in the East.  He had requested for transfer back to the West but was refused.

McClellan was also still popular and some officers resented the intrusion of Pope from the West. Pope himself played the political game and bad mouthed McClellan to gain favor with like minded politicians who wanted to see McClellan removed from command of the Army of the Potomac. Radical Republicans liked Pope because he was a vocal abolitionist and wanted to punish disloyal Southerners. He was hard on local citizens in Virginia who were suspected of condoning guerrilla forces including burning houses and shooting as spies those who refused to take oath of loyalty and returning to their homes after being banished from the area.

Pope’s motto “Headquarters in the Saddle” was ridiculed by his men.  He knew the men and some of his officers were making fun of him which undermined the spirit de corps of his new command.

When McClellan changed his base to Harrisons Landing after his defeat during the Seven Days Battles, Gen Robt. E. Lee’s army was now situated between the two Union armies. Pope refused to attack Lee…. not trusting that McClellan would cooperate with him in a joint flank attack. Instead it was decided to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from Harrisons Landing and unite it with Popes…. which was still positioned between Washington DC and Richmond. Pope had reached out and asked for advice on how to proceed from McClellan, who rebuffed his request. Maj Gen “Stonewall” Jackson was dispatched by Lee to deal with Pope before he could be reinforced by McClellan.  Lee had developed a rare personal dislike for Pope because of his bombastic claims and orders. Lee eventually realized that Pope was “all talk”.

Pope was confused and not sure of what his authority  entailed.  Troops began to arrive from Army of Potomac but at a VERY slow pace due to what some believe to be deliberate actions by  McClellan. Pope was unsure if and how to assign them the arriving forces.

Pope had assumed Halleck would take command of both Union armies once they were united.  McClellan was showing signs of jealously of Pope, slowing down transfer of his troops and was hoping for Pope’s defeat during the upcoming conflict which became known as the Second Battle of Bull Run

To further compound the issue, Pope made a serious tactical error and opened the door for Longstreet to launch a successful flank attack against him. Pope had truly underestimated his opponents, which cost him the battle.  Pope’s men retreated all the back to Washington DC for protection while Confederate forces pursued him to Chantilly VA …. only 18 miles outside the Wash DC defenses.

Pope blamed his loss on McClellan’s slowness in reinforcing him and claimed it was deliberate. There was evidence that available Union troops DID stand by idly while the battle rages. Pope instituted court-martial proceedings against V Corps commander Maj Gen Fitz John Porter who was a close friend of McClellan’s.

After his resounding defeat, e Pope wanted to renew the fight and attack Lee’s army with the abundance of fresh troops arriving around Washington DC. Unfortunately he did not have the confidence of his officers and men to accomplish a victory.

Lincoln, Halleck and Sec of War Edwin Stanton did not blame Pope for the tragic loss. They knew the game McClellan was playing who declared publically that “Pope should get out of his own scrape”. Ultimately, political pressure forced Lincoln to relieve Pope and reappoint McClellan to mainly reorganize the entire combined army.

Pope left Washington DC disappointed and was reassigned to fight the Sioux Indians in Minnesota. He was appointed Commander of the Department of the Northwest and during the following two years, complained about the rampant bribery that was occurring in his new command area.  In 1864, the New General and Chief Ulysses S .Grant expanded Popes military authority to include the states  of Missouri and Kansas  Grant realized that  John Pope got a raw deal at the hands of McClellan and was confident that his fellow Westerner was and able commander.

Pope went to serve in the military faithfully until 1886 when he retired. Sadly, he was unable recover and restore his credibility with the American public after his pompous and often controversial  comments and what he remembered in the annals of the Civil War……. his military debacle at Manassas in August 1862.

by Andy Mateja

The Battle of Antietam as many of us know was the bloodiest single day in American History. While there were many factors that led up to this epic struggle, it is important to understand the controversial effect that Special Order 191 had on the development of this battle.

As Gen Robt E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia moved north after their stunning victory at Second Bull Run (or Manassas), his plan was to draw the defeated Union army out of the fortifications surrounding Washington.  Lee intended to attack Maj Gen George B. McClellan, who was now back in command of the Army of the Potomac,   once it was out in the open. To provide clear and concise instructions to his military commanders, Lee issued Special Order 191 on Sept 9th 1862.  Lee was counting on McClellan’s extreme caution to beat him again as he did earlier during the Peninsular Campaign.

Special Order 191 addressed the issue that the Union troops at Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg did not retreat on Lee’s advance so they had to be dealt with first before attacking McClellan.  Lee’s supply line would be in jeopardy otherwise.

Maj Gen “Stonewall” Jackson assigned the task of disposing of these Union troops with six battle- hardened Confederate divisions. Lee figured it would take only three days to accomplish this while the rest of his army waited for their return. Lee was not worried about dividing his army in the face of an approaching enemy due to McClellan’s overcautious approach while protecting Washington and Baltimore at the same time. Lee would re-concentrate his army before McClellan figured out what was happening.

Unfortunately fate took a strange turn which was about to affect upcoming events. As Union forces cautiously moved forward to find their Confederate opponents moving unobstructed through Maryland, on September 13th a corporal by the name of Barton Mitchell of the 27th Indiana found envelope by the roadside about one mile south of Frederick.  It contained single sheet of paper written on both sides wrapped around three cigars.  The heading on the letter stated “From Hdqrs Army of Northern VA – Special Order 191 CONFIDENTIAL.  It was addressed to Confederate Maj Gen D.H. Hill and turned out to be Lee’s operational plan.

Lee had sent copies of Special Order 191 to all of his division and command generals. Jackson himself also sent a copy to D.H. Hill who was temporarily serving under his command. While Hill did receive the copy from Jackson, the original order from Lee’s Hdqrs was the one that never delivered and was ultimately the copy that would up in the hands of Union Commander Maj Gen George B McClellan.

McClellan was ecstatic. It was at was at this time that McClellan uttered the immortal statement to Gen John Gibbon “Here is a paper with which if I cannot whip bobby Lee, I will be willing to go home”

Up till this time McClellan had no idea what Lee was up to. He thought perhaps Lee might have been trying to head into Pennsylvania or return back to Virginia as he believed Lee  “didn’t really want to fight him” .  When he received the lost order, he immediately telegraphed President Abraham Lincoln saying “I think Lee has made a gross mistake and that he will be severely punished for it….I hope for a great success if the plans of the rebels remain unchanged….I have all the plans of the rebels and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency”.

In essence, McClellan now knew that Lee had divided his army into four separate parts three days earlier and was going after the Union forces at Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg via separate march routes for each. The Army of Northern Virginia would reassemble at either Hagerstown or Boonsboro and the entire operation was on a timetable.

However due to conflicting field reports, McClellan began to “second guess” the plan that Lee had outlined in Special Order 191 and became even more cautious. Deliberate attempts at confusion were the results of efforts by Stonewall Jackson & Maj Gen JEB Stuart. And has been his nature, McClellan was also nervous about being “outnumbered”.  He told the War Department that Lee had 120,000 men entering Maryland (the actual number was around 40,000).  McClellan believed Longstreet & DH Hill had the fewest amount of troops on hand and determined to attack them first. However unbeknownst to him, Jackson and Longstreet had already modified their orders from Lee, with Longstreet moving on Hagerstown instead of Boonsboro and Jackson moving on Harpers Ferry instead of Martinsburg.  Only D.H. Hill’s single division now remained at Boonsboro.

However to the dismay of Lincoln and the War Department, McClellan vacillated for almost 18 hours after finding the lost order before he advanced his army. Lee’s army had already been divided and scattered for several days and ripe for attack by a more aggressive opponent. Three Confederate divisions headed for Harpers Ferry while Jackson with the other three divisions advanced on Martinsburg. Maj Gen James Longstreet with D.H. Hill and two additional divisions would wait at Boonsboro for the piecemeal return of the Jackson and his forces.  Sept 12th was set for the commencement of the operations at Harpers Ferry.

McClellan did however order some of his troops to also advance on part of the Confederate forces near Harpers Ferry which were still on the Maryland side of the Potomac River. He felt he would be able to pin them against the river. However McClellan once again waited to long to order the advance.

McClellan’s version of events now began to evolve into something contrary with reality.  He reported to Washington that the “found order” he had had since noon was now just received that “evening” and only covered “some” of Lee’s plans. Pennsylvania was Lee’s supposed target now and McClellan would later claim erroneously that he frustrated Lee’s plans to invade The Keystone State.

As for the lost order itself, at first D.H. Hill was blamed for its loss. He was accused of dropping it or throwing it away since he had already received a copy direct from Jackson.  Hill said he NEVER received the order from Lee’s Hqrs – only the copy from Jackson.  The loss went undetected for several days before Lee found out and had to hastily change his plans.

News about finding a copy of Special Order 191 made it into the New York Herald on Sept 15th and also in another Northern newspaper. It was suspected that someone “leaked” the story to the press as the story mentioned the “three cigars” and had the name of the regimental colonel who forwarded it to the XII Corps commander. Some suspected multiple leakers as there was a news blackout in place ordered by War Department after Second Bull Run debacle.

After the war D.H. Hill claimed that the lost order actually helped Lee because it had misdirected McClellan as to his true intentions. Lee was furious with this claim and strongly reputed it.  Lee said he had learned during the evening of Sept 13th from JEB Stuart of McClellan’s possession of a copy of Special Order 191.  Being with Longstreet at the time near Hagerstown, Lee immediately ordered him to march back to Boonsboro, which fortunately resulted in the timely arrival and rescue D.H. Hill from certain defeat.

While the accidentally discovery of a copy of Special Order 191 was pivotal in defining the actions taken by both sides in the lead up to the horrific bloodletting at Antietam, image what the outcome would have been if Corporal Barton Mitchell had not stopped to pick up that unmarked envelope along the roadside that September morning in 1862……And would there have been an Emancipation Proclamation if Lee had defeated McClellan as he had originally intended…….???

 by Andy Mateja

It was the beginning of the end – Five Forks April 1st 1865. Some thought it was just an April Fool’s joke – After this great Union victory, Grant immediately notified Washington and ordered full assault on the entire Confederate line extending from Richmond to Petersburg.

The Union siege line continued to expand to the left in order to cut off Gen Robt E. Lee’s potential escape route. However as spring of 1865 approached, Lee had other plans which included an escape and a possible link up with the other remaining major Confederate army which was now in North Carolina.  At the time Grant commanded 112,000 men and Lee had about 50,000.  Lee was planning to link up with Gen Joseph Johnston’s Confederate forces and defeat Maj Gen William Sherman and then turn around with their combined forces and come after Grant.  The plan was ultimately hopeless.

Grant had anticipated Lee’s potential move. He ordered Maj Gen Phillip Sheridan with a combined cavalry and infantry force to cut the Southside Railroad which was Lee’s last line of supply.  In response, Lee ordered his own cavalry and infantry to attack the advancing Union forces at Five Forks.

Due to ineptness on the part of Maj Gen George Pickett who was in overall command of the endeavor, the Confederates suffered a crushing defeat and surrendered 4000 badly needed troops despite Lee’s plea to Pickett  to “Hold Five Forks at all hazards”

Lee had no choice but to abandon Petersburg and Richmond the next day (April 2nd)…… a position he held for over NINE months. Lee planned to move westward and converge on Amelia Court House which was 35 miles away and from there move by rail into North Carolina to join Johnston. Sadly one of Lee’s best commanders, Lt Gen A.P. Hill was killed during this move and Lt Gen James Longstreet took over command of Hill’s and his own remaining forces.

Several of Lee’s divisions were cut off from his main body by the debacle at Five Forks. They had to cross the Appomattox River farther north at Bevill’s Bridge.  President Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Government escaped the next day from Richmond by train to Danville. After the politicians were safely away, the remaining Confederate troops evacuated the capitol and left it in flames.

It was the beginning of a sad retreat with little or no organization for the Army of Northern VA who had marched 16 miles the first day with Longstreet’s men reaching almost 25 miles. This was an amazing feat for tired and hungry men.  All of them hoped that food and munitions supplies would be found waiting for them at Amelia Court House as Lee had ordered before leaving the lines at Petersburg.

As the Lee’s army moved, the bridge crossing were held by the first arriving division who then passed it on to the next arriving division until the entire army had crossed. This allowed for the scatted forces to successfully regroup at Amelia Court House two days later.

Grant however instead of directly pursuing Lee, sent Sheridan and his cavalry to Jetersville, south of Amelia Court House on a parallel route to prevent Lee from moving south from that position.

If Sheridan arrived there before Lee reached Amelia Court House, Lee would have to continue moving westward and farther away from a link up with Johnston while his army became weaker with every step.

Grant ordered his infantry to advance in two columns; one to follow behind Lee’s army and the other to join up with Sheridan and travel with him on the parallel route.  On Apr 4th Lee still had about 30,000 men who converged at Amelia Court House. To the disappointment of all, only ammunition was available. NO food supplies had arrived.  Inexplicable communication issues between the Confederate War Dept and Lee had delayed their departure from Richmond. Meanwhile, the Union cavalry was catching up but still not an imminent threat.

Lee, crestfallen and dejected, had no other choice but to order his men delay their movement in order to forage the local countryside for badly needed. At the same time he ordered 200,000 more rations to be sent from Danville where the Confederate government now resided.  The tired and hungry troops not finding any food at Amelia Court House, began to desert and blend away into the woods. There were still a few Confederate brigades that needed to cross the river before the final bridge could be burned to prevent Union pursuit. The delay in foraging cost Lee’s army one precious day and allowed Grant’s forces to get even closer. The saddest part of all was that the forage wagons brought back hardly anything.

On April 5th in order to expedite movement, Lee ordered his infantry to advance on one road toward Jetersville while the wagons and artillery went by another road. Union cavalry attacked the wagons and Sheridan’s dismounted cavalry had already blocked the road beyond Jetersville with Union infantry coming up fast.  Lee alternatively continued on westward toward Farmville. While he was advised by several of his commanders to stand and fight the following morning, Lee would not risk an engagement with his army that was almost starved and with no supplies in site. It now became evident that Lee had lost his lead over his Union pursuers.

Lee’s columns now had to combine with the wagons and artillery on the very same road. It was now a race for life or death.  While the front and rear of the Confederate column were solid, the center of the line was weak and becoming disoriented.

Union infantry now under Maj Gen George Meade had caught up with Sheridan and were planning to attack Lee on April 6th at Amelia Court House. However unbeknownst to Meade, Lee had already moved westward and his infantry pursued as close as possible while Sheridan and the cavalry paralleled Lee’s movements on an alternate road.

On April 6th Lee ordered the Flat Creek Bridge to be burned while his main column advanced toward Rice’s Station. He was also told that 80,000 rations waited for his hungry army at Farmville only a few hours distant….if they can get there. Lee’s men under Lt Gen Richard Ewell unwisely decided to protect the wagons against Union cavalry harassment without advising Lee, thereby creating an unfortunate gap in the center of the line.

Sheridan took advantage of the gap created by Ewell and attacked the weakly defended wagons and artillery at Sayler’s Creek.  He had essentially divided Lee’s column and stood squarely in the way of their reconnecting it.  Ewell further compounded the problem by separating the wagons from the rest of the column and taking an alternate fork to bypass the Union cavalry blockade. By doing so Ewell further separated his men from support of the rest of Confederate army.  Ewell’s 7000 men were now facing the enemy front and rear and completely isolated. Bedlam reigned in Ewell’s ranks as his men, feeling cut off and surrounded, put up only token resistance. Some however did break through to region Lee’s main army.

Lee’s army suffered over 6000 prisoners at Sayler’s Creek including NINE generals.  When Lee learned of this massive capture of men and wagons he said in disbelief “ My God has this army dissolved ?”           He immediately relieved Anderson, Pickett and Johnson of command. His effective army strength was about half of what it was when he abandoned Richmond & Petersburg a few days before. He still had to cross the Appomattox River to reach Farmville and the food rations waiting for his men.

On April 7th Lee’s men reached Farmville and the first food that many of them had in several days.  It was here that the first talk of surrender occurred between Lee’s remaining generals. Compounding the issue was that the High Bridge was not burned as expected allowing the Federal troops to continue to aggressively advance on Lee’s men. The starving Confederates barely had a chance to taste their food before that had to continue moving to escape their pursuers – still moving to the west instead of south.  Their rendezvous with Appomattox Station, where more food supplies awaited, was only 22 miles away.

Grant was also thinking about the surrender of Lee’s army and at 5PM on April 7th he sent a note to Lee under a flag of truce. “The results of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in its struggle. I feel it is so and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the C.S. army known as the Army of Northern Virginia” were the words Grant wrote down in his historic communiqué.

Lee still not convinced to throw in the towel, discussed the matter with Longstreet who concurred with Lee and said “Not yet”.  Lee then replied to Grant stating he felt the situation was not hopeless and asked what terms would Grant offer should he consider surrender ?

The next day rumors circulated through the Confederate ranks that notes passed between Lee and Grant and Lee himself was approached by his own artillery chief Maj Gen Pendleton that it was time to surrender. Lee dismissed Pendleton’s recommendation completely and refused to make eye contact with his General.   Grant sent off a reply that afternoon to Lee which didn’t arrive until the morning of April 9th.  In it Grant said that peace was his greatest desire and that the men surrendered take their parole and return to their homes not to bear arms again until properly exchanged. Lee reiterated his believe that the emergence has not yet arisen to call for the surrender of his army but that he gladly discuss the restoration of peace the following morning. Grant did not have the authority for this type of negotiation which he promptly declined. He would only talk about the surrender of Lee’s Army

In the meantime Sheridan had wedged his cavalry between Lee’s army and Appomattox Station and there were Union infantry on his heels.  Lee was trapped.  Lee held his last council of war, and decided it was time to go and meet with Gen Grant after one final attempt to “breakout”.

The attempt was made at 5AM on the morning of April 9th which had failed.  Lee now heard from Longstreet and several of his other generals that it was indeed time for surrender….. All Proud and Gallant Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia could sadly say was “then there is nothing left for me to do but go and see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths…”

by Andy Mateja

After successfully repelling Maj Gen George B. McClellan’s juggernaut to capture Richmond at the end of June 1862, Gen Robt E. Lee dispatched Maj Gen Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson and several of his best divisions to intercept the newly formed Union Army of Virginia under the command of Maj Gen John Pope.  Pope’s army was comprised of remnants of Maj Gen John C. Fremont (now under Maj Gen Franz Siegel) & Maj Gen Nathaniel Bank’s commands on Northerners in the Shenandoah Valley and Maj Gen Irwin McDowell’s corps. Once concentrated, Pope’s army would total 44,000 men and would also move on Richmond to provide an additional front and relieve Lee’s pressure on McClellan.

Lee’s orders to Jackson were to protect the Virginia Central and the Orange & Alexandria Railroads which were vital supply lines for the Confederates. Lee also wanted Jackson with his 24,000 men to disrupt Pope’s concentrations efforts in mid -Virginia while he and the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia kept the pressure on McClellan’s larger force which had been backed into a corner at Harrison’s Landing

Pope learned of Jackson’s advance and wanted to destroy him before he was able to concentrate at Culpepper which was 40 miles west of Fredericksburg. The race was on as BOTH armies had the same objective. As Jackson advanced the Union cavalry fell back to their artillery position which was situated in the hilly and wooded terrain all around with cornfields scattered throughout.

Pope’s I Corp commander (Banks) jumped the gun and attacked Jackson’s forces before the Union army was concentrated. This provided Jackson with an initial advantage as his forces at this time now outnumbered his Union opponents by almost 3 to 1.

The battle of Cedar Mountain commenced with a one hour artillery duel. Pope’s infantry then attacked the lead Confederate brigade commanded by Maj Gen Jubal Early. Early moved his men forward to protect exposed Southern artillery. Early then called for reinforcements and members of the vaunted Stonewall Brigade answered the call.

Unfortunately these Confederate reinforcements had panicked and began to fell when they thought they were being outflanked. Disturbed by this turn of events, Jackson personally led the turnaround of his beloved Stonewall Brigade while additional reinforcements from Maj Gen A.P. Hills Light Division arrived. This was the first of several times that Hill’s troops made a timely arrival on a battlefield to save the day.

Union troops now began to fall back being outnumbered by the Confederates and flanked on both sides. The 1st Pennsylvania Union Cavalry tried to blunt the advancing Confederate line by charging straight into the center. The only result was more confusion and a high casualty rate of 164 troopers out of the 235 making the suicidal attack. Darkness mercifully ended the battle with Jackson’s men occupying the original ground they started the day with.

The next day Maj Gen JEB Stuart arrived and took command of cavalry. His reconnaissance confirmed heavy Union reinforcements had arrived and were digging in to await further attacks. A Truce was called the following day to bury the dead. Total Union losses were 2481 while Confederate losses were 1314.

Jackson had decided to fall back to Gordonsville to regroup. Both sides claimed victory but Jackson was unsuccessful preventing Pope’s troop concentration and further advance.

Cedar Mountain was the opening battle that ultimately led to the major Confederate victory at Second Manassas. Stonewall Jackson was to play a significant role in future maneuvers and the aggressive fighting that led to that victory.
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